Chapter XX
Endnotes
1 This chapter was originally prepared in Japanese by Capt. (Navy) Atsushi Oi. For duty assignments of this officer, cf. n. 1. Chapter X. All source materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2 Historical Section Files, GHQ FEC.
2 The jushin (literally, "principal subjects") comprised all living statesmen who at one time had held the post of Premier; it also included the Privy Council President. Like the genro, or "elder statesmen" whose function they in part inherited, the jushin had no constitutional position. The Emperor's consultations with the jushin were usually carried out by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, traditionally the Emperor's closest political advisor. Baron Reijiro Wakatsuki, Admiral Keisuke Okada, Koki Hirota, Prince Ayamaro Konoye, Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, General Nobu yuki Abe, Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai and Baron Yoshimichi Hara, Privy Council President, made up the jushin group at that time. Wakatsuki, Okada and Konoye were more active in the move toward peace.
3 Statement by Admiral (ret.) Keisuke Okada, Premier, Jul 34-Feb 36.
4 General Hideki Tojo already held the post of War Minister in addition to the premiership. The action whereby he and Navy Minister Shimada installed themselves simultaneously as Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs was criticized in some Army and Navy circles as reminiscent of the usurpation of Imperial prerogatives by the Tokugawa Shogunate. (Cf. Chapter X, n. 25.)
5 (1) Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban ni okeru Hikokunin Kido Koichi no Sensei Kokyosho (Affidavit of Defendant Koichi Kido in International Military Tribunal for the Far East) For English translation, see IMTFE Record, pp. 31,076-104. (2) Shusen Oboegaki ( Notes on the Termination of the War) Kobun-do, Tokyo, 1948, pp. 7-12.
6 General Tojo himself recognized that the jushin were instrumental in causing his downfall. When he went to the Imperial Palace to tender the Cabinet's resignation, he was asked by Marquis Kido if he desired to recommend a successor to the premiership. His reply was, "I think that the responsibility of the jushin for the present cabinet change is heavy. In consequence, they may have already formulated their own plan. Therefore, I will not express my views." In fact, the jushin, in response to an Imperial command, met at 1600 the same day (18 July) and decided their recommendations to the Throne. Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., IMTFE Record, p. 31,082.
7 In accordance with standard practice, Marshal Sugiyama was selected for the War Minister's post by the Army "Big Three": the outgoing War Minister, General Tojo; the Chief of Army General Staff, General Yoshijiro Umezu; and the Inspectorate General of Military Training, Marshal Sugiyama himself. General Tojo had also resigned as Chief of Army General Staff on 18 July. General Umezu immediately succeeded him.
8 Since the Navy Minister had to be an admiral or vice admiral in active service, Yonai was hastily restored to the active list while the formation of the Cabinet was in progress. This essential move had been planned well in advance of the downfall of the Tojo Cabinet.
9 Direct Testimony of Defendant Kuniaki Koiso. IMTFE Record, pp. 32,251-4.
10 The Supreme War Direction Council, formed on 5 August 1944, consisted of six members : the Premier, the Foreign, Navy, and War Ministers, and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs.
11 Shigemitsu, in line with Army and Navy policy, inserted in the basic declaration a clause which provided that "in the event Germany collapses or makes a separate peace, Japan will attempt to improve her world position through utilizing the Soviet Union." According to post-war statements by Shigemitsu, his purpose in inserting this proviso was "to obtain a certain amount of freedom of diplomatic action, which could be gradually developed into a peace move." (Statement by Mamoru Shigemitsu, Foreign Minister, Apr 43-Apr 45.)
12 (1) Ibid. (2) Affidavit of Koiso, op. cit., IMTFE Record, p. 23, 253.
13 Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., IMTFE Record, p. 31,150.
14 "Since it was the common belief that the jushin were advocates of peace (Konoye, Okada, Wakatsuki and Yonai), it was almost certain that, if an audience were granted, they would be suspected of advising the Emperor to end the war. Consequently, a very grave problem would arise." (Statement by Marquis Yasumasa Matsudaira, Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Jun 36-Nov 45.)
15 Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., IMTFE Record, pp. 31,113-14.
16 In March Koiso proposed to launch such overtures through the intermediary of Miao Pin, a Chinese who was believed to have close connections with General Ho Ying-chin, Chiang Kai-shek's minister of war. Koiso invited Miao Pin to Tokyo, but the plan collapsed due to the opposition of the Foreign, War and Navy Ministers, who strongly doubted that Miao Pin was a trustworthy and qualified intermediary. (1) Ibid., pp. 31,115-16. (2) Statement by General Koiso, previously cited.
17 Affidavit of Koiso, op. cit., IMTFE Record, pp. 32,254-6.
18 The five-year neutrality pact had been concluded on 13 April 1941 and was not to expire until April 1946. The Foreign Office revealed the Soviet Government's abrogation notice without comment in an announcement issued at 1400 on 6 April. Nippon Times, Tokyo, 7 Apr 45.
19 (1) Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., IMTFE Record, pp. 31,118-19. (2) Kido Nikki (Kido Diary) Entry for 4 Apr 45.
20 The six former Premiers attending the conference were: Prince Ayamaro Konoye, Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, Baron Reijiro Wakatsuki, Admiral Keisuke Okada, Mr. Koki Hirota, and General Hideki Tojo. Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., IMTFE Record, p. 31,122. (Two jushin were absent: Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, who was barred from participating by reason of his tenure of the deputy premiership and naval portfolio in the outgoing Cabinet; and General Hiroyuki Abe, currently serving as Governor-General of Korea.)
21 Suzuki was among those marked for assassination because he was believed to have played an important part in engineering acceptance of the London naval disarmament treaty over the opposition of the Navy General Staff, and also because he opposed military encroachment in political affairs. Admiral Viscount Makoto Saito, then Lord Privy Seal, Viscount Korekiyo Takahashi, then Finance Minister, both liberals, and General Jotaro Watanabe, then Army Inspectorate General of Military Training, were those actually killed. Admiral Okada, then Premier, eacaped assassination only because his brother-in-law was mistaken for him. Suzuki's life was saved by his wife, who shielded his body with her own after he had been wounded, preventing the assassins from completing the job. Both Prince Saionji and Count Makino, the Emperor's most trusted statesmen, were saved thanks to a timely police warning.
22 Marquis Matsudaira, who had long been a prominent Court official and who served as chief secretary to Lord Privy Seal, Marquis Kido for ten years, describes the relations between the Emperor and Admiral Suzuki as follows "The Emperor embraced an especially warm feeling for the Admiral....He always felt, 'I can tell Suzuki what I really want to say without hesitation." (Statement by Marquis Matsudaira, previously cited.)
23 Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., IMTFE Record, p. 31,123.
28 At the time of the Koiso cabinet's resignation, considerable sentiment existed among certain elements in the War Ministry and Army High Command in favor of a succeeding government headed by an active Army General, mainly with a view to fighting the decisive homeland battle. The most favored candidate of these elements was General Korechika Anami, Inspectorate General of Army Aviation and former commander of the Second Area Army in Western New Guinea and Halmahera, while some quarters favored Marshal Shunroku Hata, and others General Umezu, Chief of the Army General Staff. Nevertheless, when Marquis Kido, immediately following Koiso's resignation, asked for the views of the War and Navy Ministers and Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staff regarding the next Cabinet, neither War Minister Sugiyama nor General Umezu positively expressed themselves in favor of a cabinet under Army leadership. (1) Statement by Lt. Col. Masao Inaba, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry. (2) Kido Diary, op. cit. Entry for 5 Apr 45, appended pages relative to talks with Marshal Sugiyama and General Umezu.
29 Affidavit of Kido, op. cit. IMTFE Record, pp. 31,138-141.
31 No written record of this conversation exists, and there is some question as to the explicitness of the language used by Marquis Kido to convey to Admiral Suzuki the Emperor's desire for early peace. Replying to a questionnaire submitted by the author in May 1949, Kido stated that he explicitly told Suzuki that it was the Emperor's desire "to have the war terminated during your premiership." However, when interrogated further on this point on 20 December 1949, Kido admitted that he "did not explicitly say that the mission of the next government should be to end the war quickly", but that he used "such words as could be taken that way" and that his impression at the time was that "Suzuki understood what I meant." It appears most probable, therefore, that Kido did not go beyond stressing the Emperor's grave concern over the trend of the war and his desire for a drastic about-face in policy. Post-war statements by Suzuki confirm, however, that he understood from his talks with Kido and the Emperor that the mission of his Cabinet was to be the conclusion of an early peace. (Cf. n. 33) (1) Statements by Marquis Kido, previously cited. (2) Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., IMTFE Record, p. 31,143.
32 According to Marquis Matsudaira, who was at this time Chief Secretary to Marquis Kido, the Emperor refrained from any explicit mention of peace in his initial talk with Admiral Suzuki because he already "knew the general course in which the Admiral's thinking was being directed" and felt that a hasty approach at this stage would be unwise. Matsudaira states that the Emperor told him after the war, "I was aware of Suzuki's mind from the very first... .and was convinced that Suzuki understood what I really had in mind. Consequently, I was not in a hurry to communicate to him my desire for peace in express words." (Statement by Marquis Matsudaira, previously cited.)
33 (1) Interrogated by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in December 1945, Admiral Suzuki stated, "At the time I became Premier, I did not receive any direct order from the Emperor, but I understood clearly from what the Emperor said to me at that time that he was very much concerned over the situation that Japan faced in the war, ...over the death of civilians due to bombing, the general sickness and great number of civilian casualties, and the great losses in the field of battle. U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Interrogations, No. 531. (2) Statement by Vice Adm. Seizo Sakonji, State Minister without portfolio, Suzuki Cabinet.
34 Statement by Lt. Col. Masatoki Shirai, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry. (The drafting of the Army's conditions was assigned to Lt. Col. Shirai.)
35 (1) Ibid. (2) War Ministry Radio, Vice-Minister of War to Commanding Generals of all Armies, 6 Apr 45.
36 The Army and Navy required that War and Navy Ministers be chosen from general or flag officers in active service, which enabled them to block the formation of a cabinet by refusing to nominate a minister. Admiral Suzuki had to reckon with the possibility that the Army would resort to the device if he declined to accept the stipulated conditions.
37 According to Admiral Okada's son-in-law, Mr. Hisatsune Sakomizu, Admiral Suzuki contacted Okada by telephone early on 6 April and requested his assistance in selecting the Cabinet. Mr. Sakomizu, who himself was given the post of Chief Cabinet Secretary on Admiral Okada's recommendation, saw a significant indication of Admiral Suzuki's intentions in the fact that he relied almost exclusively on Okada's advice rather than on that of Baron Hiranuma, also a member of the jushin group which secured Suzuki's nomination, but a man with far less pronounced peace convictions than Okada. Only one person, Kozo Ota, recommended by Hiranuma, was given a cabinet post as Education Minister. (Statement by Mr. Hisatsune Sakomizu, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Suzuki Cabinet.)
38 Mr. Sakomizu, already picked by Suzuki as Chief Cabinet Secretary, conferred with Lt. Gen. Masao Yoshizumi, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, regarding the Army's attitude toward Yonai. Lt. Gen. Yoshizumi informed Sakomizu that the Army considered Yonai unsuitable for several reasons but did not go so far as to reject him. (Statement by Lt. Gen. Masao Yoshizumi, Chief, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry.)
39 Admiral Yonai felt that it was improper to enter the new Cabinet since he had been Deputy Premier of the preceding Government and shared responsibility for its failure. He wished to be succeeded as Navy Minister by Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye, then Vice-Minister and a strong liberal, but the latter declined, and Yonai instead recommended Admiral Kiyoshi Hasegawa. Kido Diary, op. cit. (Entry for 5 Apr 45, appended pages covering talk with Admiral Yonai regarding next cabinet.)
40 Kido made this recommendation because he already knew Shigemitsu's views and felt that "his retention would facilitate the early realization of peace." Suzuki at this time expressed concurrence. (Statement by Marquis Kido, previously cited.)
41 (1) Affidavit of Admiral Baron Kantaro Suzuki. IMTFE Record, pp. 35,590-91. (2) Statement by Marquis Kido, previously cited.
42 The Cabinet list covering posts other than the top four already mentioned was as follows: Home Affairs, Genki Abe ; Finance, Toyosaku Hirose; Munitions, Admiral Teijiro Toyoda; Agriculture and Commerce, Tadaatsu Ishiguro; Transportation, Naoto Kohiyama; Education, Kozo Ota; Justice, Hiromasa Matsuzaka; Welfare, Tadahiko Okada. Also included in the Cabinet were four State Ministers without portfolio: Vice Adm. Seizo Sakonji, Lt. Gen. Toji Yasui, Hyogoro Sakurai, and Hiroshi (Kainan) Shimomura (the last serving concurrently as President of the Cabinet Information Board). Three others who were not Cabinet members but sat in on its discussions were: Lt. Gen. Tsukizo Akinaga, Chief of the Cabinet Coordination and Planning Bureau; Mr. Hisatsune Sakomizu, Chief Cabinet Secretary; and Naokai Murase, Chief of the Legal Bureau.
43 The Mainichi dubbed the new Cabinet as a " Cabinet to repulse the enemy" and saw its primary mission in the "consolidation of the fighting strength of the entire nation." Although this was the general theme, the more liberal Asahi cautiously referred to the importance of diplomacy as the "other half of war policy" and hinted that the new Cabinet might be obliged to give its diplomacy "a drastic turn in a new direction." (1) Mainichi Shimbun (Mainichi Newspaper) Tokyo, 8 and 9 Apr 45. (2) Asahi Shimbun (Asahi Newspaper) Tokyo, 7 and 11 Apr 45.
44 In this broadcast, Suzuki exhorted the nation "to march on over my dead body when I die for my country." Raikichi Kono, Shusen no Hyojo: Suzuki Kantaro Jutsu (Features of the Termination of the War; as told by Kantaro Suzuki) Rodo Bunka Sha, Tokyo, 1946, pp. 10-11.
45 Togo told Marquis Matsudaira, Kido's chief secretary, following this, meeting that he (Togo) and Premier Suzuki were agreed in principle regarding the necessity of ending the war. Whereas, Togo, however, held that it must be terminated as soon as possible, Premier Suzuki had expressed the opinion that Japan might be able to continue fighting for " two or three years more, depending on the circumstances ". In view of this difference of opinion, Togo told Matsudaira, he felt that he and Premier Suzuki would have difficulty in agreeing on high policy regarding the war, and he therefore did not wish to accept the Foreign Ministry until he was certain of Suzuki's attitude. Affidavit of Marquis Matsudaira, previously cited. IMTFE Record, p. 35,59 6 .
46 (1) Affidavit of Hisatsune Sakomizu. IMTFE Record, pp. 35,604-5. (2) Affidavit of Marquis Matsu- daira, op. cit., IMTFE Record, pp. 3559 6- 7. (3) Affidavit of Shigenori Togo. IMTFE Record, pp. 35,779-80.
47 The hostile attitude of some of the extremist elements toward the Suzuki Government was not entirely allayed by Suzuki's acceptance of the Army's policy conditions. One evidence of this was the fact that Col. Kenji Ogoshi, Chief of the General Affairs Section of Kempeitai Headquarters, called on the Premier a week after his appointment and warned him that there were elements who suspected that he was "conspiring for surrender". To this Suzuki cryptically replied that his greatest concern was "to remain loyal to the Emperor." Jo-o (Queen) Magazine, Tokyo, Sep 49: Fall of the Japanese Army.
48 In a statement made to American interrogators after the surrender, Admiral Suzuki described his difficult position upon becoming Premier as follows: "On the one hand, I had to carry out to the best of my ability the mission given me by the Emperor, to arrange for the conclusion of the war, whereas if anyone heard of this, I naturally would have been attacked and probably killed by people opposed to such a policy." USSBS Interrogation No. 531, op. cit.
49 In talks with the War and Navy Ministers and top leaders of the Army and Navy General Staffs soon after the formation of the Suzuki Cabinet, Foreign Minister Togo strongly emphasized the necessity of expending the greatest possible strength in order to win the Okinawa battle. Victory, he pointed out, would afford Japanese diplomacy a "basis for positive action," whereas defeat would virtually rule out such action. These talks, referred to elsewhere, had to do with proposed moves to assure continued Soviet neutrality toward Japan and did not go so far as to touch on diplomatic action for peace, but Togo at least had both objectives in mind. Togo Memoirs (Unpublished Memoirs of Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, covering the period Apr-Aug 45, pp. 7-8.)
50 The secretariat of the Supreme War Direction Council consisted of four secretaries and seven assistant secretaries. The secretaries were: Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu; Lt. Gen. Masao Yoshizumi, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry; Vice Adm. Zenshiro Hoshina, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry; and Lt. Gen. Tsukizo Akinaga, Chief of the Cabinet Coordination and Planning Bureau. The assistant secretaries included subordinate officials of the Military and Naval Affairs Bureaus and Cabinet Coordination and Planning Bureau; of the Army and Navy General Staffs, and of the Foreign Office and Greater East Asia Ministry. The assistant secretaries usually conducted such surveys. (Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu, previously cited.)
51 This fear had been sharply increased by the Soviet Government's notification on 5 April that it did not intend to renew the five-year Soviet Japanese neutrality pact. In addition, there were ominous reports that Soviet troops were being shifted back from Europe to the Soviet-Manchurian border.
52 (1) Togo Memoirs, op. cit., p. 4. (2) This matter was first broached to Foreign Minister Togo by Lt. Gen. Kawabe, Deputy-Chief of the Army General Staff, on 22 April. Coincidentally, this was the same day that Soviet troops entered Berlin. Statement by Lt. Gen. Torashiro Kawabe, Deputy-Chief, Army General Staff.
53 Togo Memoirs, op, cit., pp. 4 and 8.
54 In his affidavit to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Marquis Kido stressed the shackling effect of Japan's treaty commitments to Germany in the following words: "Up to Germany's surrender, it was thought that it would be open to criticism from the viewpoint of international faith to make peace proposals on the part of the Emperor even if the time had virtually come for the purpose.... Now that Germany was gone, I believed that it would be desirable for the Emperor to make up his mind at this juncture, as peace would be restored to the world according to Japan's attitude." Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., IMTFE Record, pp. 31,143-4.
55 In his report to the Emperor, Foreign Minister Togo analyzed the causes of Germany's defeat, attributing major importance to the crushing effect of Allied aerial warfare. He pointed out in this connection that enemy air attacks on Japan were steadily mounting in severity, and that as a result production had slumped so alarmingly as to render continuation of the war a virtual impossibility. Future policy, he said, would have to be formulated in the light of these conditions. (1) Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited. (2) Togo Memoirs, op. cit., p. 6. (3) Affidavit of Togo, op. cit., IMTFE Record, pp. 35, 781-2.
56 Togo was encouraged to adopt this course of action by his impression, based on confidential talks with War Minister Anami and General Umezu, Chief of the Army General Staff, that neither of these two top Army leaders were personally opposed to the principle of terminating the war. From the viewpoint of obtaining peace conditions which the Army could accept, they insisted that a big military victory must precede any approach to the Allies. In an exchange of views which Togo had with Anami toward the end of April, Anami expressed general agreement that the situation was serious and indicated that he favored continued efforts to reach a separate peace with China as a prelude to a general peace attempt. (1) Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited. (2) Togo Memoirs, op. cit., p. 14
57 Togo was convinced that only by restricting the meetings of the Supreme War Direction Council in this manner could an opportunity be created for the leaders of the Government, on the one hand, and the High Command, on the other, to engage in frank discussions on the question of terminating the war. (It is highly significant that, subsequent to the May meetings on the Soviet problem, the principle of restricted discussions was followed up to the final surrender decision, with the noteworthy exception of the Council meeting on 6 June, dealt within the following section of this chapter.) (1) Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited. (2) Togo Memoirs, op. cit., p. 6.
58 Togo Memoirs, op. cit., p. 6.
59 According to Togo, this agreement was adopted at the insistence of one of the military members of the Council and was strongly supported by the Foreign Minister himself. His recollection is that it was Admiral Koshiro Oikawa, Chief of Navy General Staff, who insisted 'that the agreement be adopted. (Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited.)
60 Suzuki, in advancing this proposal, expressed the opinion that Stalin was a man who could be trusted. Togo took a contrary view, arguing that Russia's natural desire must be to reduce Japan to a position of weakness, and that only by extensive concessions could she be induced to modify her attitude. In fact, Togo's outlook regarding the use of Russia as a peace intermediary was extremely skeptical, but it was generally recognized at this time that the Soviet Union was the only neutral power which, if it could be persuaded to do so, might influence the United States and Britain to relax their insistence upon Japan's unconditional surrender. Ibid.
61 It was agreed that Japan must be prepared to scrap the Portsmouth Peace Treaty and other basic treaties with Russia, and to make the following concessions: 1. Recession of southern Karafuto (Sakhalin); 2. Relinquishment of fishing rights in Soviet waters; 3. Freedom of the Tsugaru Strait; 4. Transfer of North Manchurian railways; 5. Recognition of Soviet sphere of influence in Inner Mongolia; 6. Lease to Russia of Port Arthur and Dairen; 7. If necessary, cession to Russia of the northern half of the Chishima (Kurile) Islands. However, Korea was to remain Japanese, and a maximum degree of independence was to be sought for Manchuria by means of establishing South Manchuria as a neutral zone and other means. Official Précis Agreements reached by Supreme War Direction Council, 11, 12 and 14 May 45.
62 Account of the discussions which took place at the Supreme War Direction Council meetings on 11, 12 and 14 May is based on the following sources in the absence of any official minutes : Statements by Admiral Koshiro Oikawa, Chief of Navy General Staff, and Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited. (Togo and Oikawa are, at the date of this writing, the only surviving participants in these discussions.)
63 Immediately after the three-day meeting Togo drew up a précis and it was initialled by the participants. This original document was destroyed when the Foreign Ministry was bombed on 25 May, but Togo made a replica which was initialled, this time, only by Premier Suzuki. This replica was given to Admiral Soemu Toyoda when he succeeded Admiral Oikawa as Chief of Navy General Staff, and this is the only copy of the précis remaining. Official précis, op. cit. (2) Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited.
64 Foreign Minister Togo hoped that this action would help toward "removing, if possible, the distrust and ill-feeling existing between Russia and Japan." Togo Memoirs, op. cit., p. 6.
65 The object of the preliminary talks was mainly to sound out how far the aims agreed upon could be attempted and what would be the best way to persuade the Soviet Government. Ibid., p. 7.
66 Foreign Office Radios: No. 843, Foreign Minister to Japanese Ambassador at Moscow, 28 Jun 45.
67 During his tenure of office under the Koiso Cabinet, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu had held private talks with Mr. Widar Bagge, Swedish Minister to Japan, regarding possible Swedish mediation between Japan and the Allies. Togo was not informed of these talks when he became Foreign Minister, but on 11 April Bagge, then about to return to Stockholm, approached Togo through a third person to ascertain whether Togo also was agreeable to Swedish mediation. Togo expressed interest but was unable to pursue the conversations due to Bagge's departure. Back in Stockholm, Bagge contacted the Japanese Minister, Mr. Okamoto, sometime in May in order to discuss the matter further. Okamoto requested instructions from Tokyo and was notified that he should take no further action for the time being. According to postwar statements by Togo, he thought at first that Bagge had in mind an offer of mediation by the Swedish Government on its own initiative. However, when Okamoto's telegrams later clarified that Sweden would only act as a transmitting agent for Japanese peace proposals, Togo decided that such an approach was unlikely to produce anything better than unconditional surrender and that Soviet mediation was the only alternative. (1) Affidavit of Widar Bagge, former Swedish Minister to Japan. IMTFE Record, pp. 34,559-64. (2) Statements by Suemasa Okamoto, Japanese Minister to Sweden and Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited.
68 Sources covering the Dulles-Fujimura negotiations and the Tokyo reaction thereto are as follows: (1) Memorandum notes of Rear Adm. Sokichi Takagi, political adviser to Chief of Navy General Staff and Navy Minister. (2) Statements by Rear Adm. Sadatoshi Tomioka, First Bureau (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section; Admiral Soemu Toyoda, Chief of Navy General Staff; Vice Adm. Zenshiro Hoshina, Chief, Naval Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry; Capt. Yoshimasa Suezawa, Chief, Naval Affairs Section, Navy Ministry; and Comdr. Yoshikazu Fujimura, Special Naval Attache, Japanese Legation, Switzerland.
69 Since the early part of May, Diet leaders had been insistently pressing the Government to convoke a special session. Certain members of the Cabinet felt, in view of these demands, that it would have an injurious effect on public morale if the Government by-passed the Diet and enforced severe emergency war measures by decree. Yonai, on the contrary, felt that a Diet session was highly inopportune since it would oblige the Government to take an outwardly strong stand for continuation of the war, which would interfere with behind-the-scenes efforts to promote an agreement on peace. Marquis Kido likewise feared that the strong war sentiment usually expressed at Diet sessions would " hamper peace moves." (1) Statements by Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu and Vice Adm. Sakonji, both previously cited. (2) Memorandum notes of Rear Adm. Takagi, op. cit. (3) Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., IMTFE Record, p. 31,146.
70 Col. Tanemura submitted his draft to the Chief and Deputy-Chief of the Army General Staff and to War Minister Anami and obtained their approval in mid-April. He notified the Cabinet representatives of this fact when he transmitted the draft to them in latter part of May. (Statement by Col. Sako Tanemura, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry.)
71 The seven assistant secretaries of the Council, of whom four were representative of the War and Navy Ministries and Army and Navy General Staffs, met twice weekly to discuss matters of war policy. It was customary for these officials to exercise a large amount of initiative in proposing and preparing for regular Council meetings, including the drafting of documents and reports to be acted upon. It is not clear whether the Army representatives initiated the proposal for adoption of a new basic war policy in this instance, but they definitely played the major role in drafting the policy itself. (Statements by Col. Tanemura and Capt. Suezawa, both previously cited; Suezaw: was Navy Ministry member and Tanemura War Ministry member of the assistant secretaries group.
72 In the absence of any written records covering this preliminary phase of the discussions, post-war statements by surviving participants are the only available sources of information. These statements are contradictory on many points of fact, but a careful weighing of all the evidence supports the following conclusions, which are essentially stated in the text: 1. Both the wording and interpretation of the basic policy draft were discussed between the military and Cabinet representatives. 2. The Cabinet representatives did not attempt to insert in the draft any explicit peace provision. They did, however, try to soften the wording and to place major emphasis, in the interpretation of the policy, on the limitation of war objectives to "the preservation of the national polity and the protection of the Imperial Homeland." 3. Actually, only minor changes were made in the wording of the Army-proposed draft. (1) Statements by Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu, Capt. Suezawa and Col. Tanemura, all previously cited.
73 Saiko Senso Shido Kaigi Tsuzuri (Proceedings of the Supreme War Direction Council, Part II : Basic Policy for Future Direction of the War.)
74 Throughout the basic policy draft, the term Kodo (Imperial domain) was employed in place of hondo, (Homeland) the term customarily used to denote the Japanese Homeland. The former, in its strict and normal meaning, included Korea and Formosa, but as used in the basic policy, it was unquestionably intended to denote only the homeland, since decisive battle operations were planned only for the defense of that area.
75 The conclusions stated in the report on national strength were based on data gathered by the Council secretariat as part of the comprehensive resurvey of the national war potential begun shortly after the formation of the Suzuki Cabinet. This was completed about the middle of May. Proceedings of the Supreme War Direction Council, op. cit. Part II Present State of the National Strength.
76 The report noted incipient signs of dissension among the Allies but estimated that enemy unity would be maintained unless the war were prolonged. Although Soviet entry into the war against Japan was rated the greater probability, the report pointed to a possibility that Russia might press Japan to make peace with the United States. Ibid., Estimate of the World Situation.
77 Lt. Gen. Kawabe attended the Council meeting in place of General Umezu, who had left Tokyo for an important conference at Dairen with the commanding generals of the Kwantung Army and China Expeditionary Forces. Umezu carried with him an Imperial General Headquarters order calling for a revision of command dispositons on the Continent to meet a possible attack by Soviet Russia. (Statement by Lt. Gen. Kawabe, previously cited.)
78 Lt. Gen. Kawabe's statement on 6 June is summarized from an original document giving the substance of his identical statement made two days later at the Imperial conference which finally adopted the basic policy. Proceedings of the Supreme War Direction Council, op. cit. Part II: Summary of Statement by the Deputy-Chief of Army General Staff.
79 Admiral Toyoda's remarks at the 6 June meeting were more pessimistic than his statement at the subsequent Imperial conference, which was redrafted between the two meetings. In the absence of any record of his 6 June statement as actually presented before the Council, its general contents are summarized from the draft materials prepared in the Navy General Staff and submitted to Toyoda to be used as a basis for his statement. Ibid., Summary of statement by the Chief of Navy General Staff.
80 According to statements made by Togo after the war, he had not been notified of the contents of the basic policy draft before attending the 6 June meeting, although it was customary for the Council secretaries to circulate such documents to all members of the Council in advance of the meeting at which they were to be discussed. In this case, it appears that Togo was the only member who had not seen the policy draft in advance. He states: "When the conference got under way, I was surprised to discover that a very strongly-worded resolution to continue the war was being brought up for debate.... The whole thing was a surprise to me." (Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited.)
81 The council deliberated on the question of evacuating the capital near the end of the conference. Premier Suzuki, on this point, strongly contended that the capital must be defended to the last. Proceedings of the Supreme War Direction Council, op. cit. Part II.
82 The draft policy had been submitted to Yonai before the 6 June meeting by Vice Adm. Hoshina, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry and one of the secretaries of the Supreme War Direction Council. According to Hoshina, Yonai at this time paid little attention to the draft. (Statement by Vice Adm. Hoshina, previously cited.)
83 In the absence of detailed official records covering the 6 June meeting of the Supreme War Direction Council, the discussions on the basic policy draft are summarized on the basis of the following sources: (1) Original Notes taken by Admiral Soemu Toyoda, Chief of Navy General Staff, at 6 June meeting. Proceedings of the Supreme War Direction Council, op. cit. Part I : Official Summary of Statement by the Munitions Minister at 8 June Council Meet-ing; and Part II. (The Munitions Minister's remarks at both 6 and 8 June meetings were substantially the same. (2) Statements by Foreign Minister Togo, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu, Lt. Gen. Yoshizumi, Vice Adm. Hoshina, all previously cited.
84 The opening statement of general policy was amended to read: "On the strength of its advantageous geographical position and the undying loyalty and solidarity of its people, (the Empire will prosecute the war to the end in order to preserve the national polity and protect the Imperial homeland, thereby accomplishing the objectives of the war." The italicized passage was substituted for the words " securing the foundations for the future development of the race." According to the recollection of Foreign Minister Togo, the change was made because the original phrasing was thought susceptable to misinterpretation. (1) Proceedings of the Supreme War Direction Council, op. cit. Part I: Basic Policy for Future Direction of the War. (a) Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited.
85 As redrafted in the Navy General Staff, Admiral Toyoda's statement contained the estimate that 60 to 70 per cent of an enemy invasion force would be able to effect a landing if the invasion attempt were made at an early date. In delivering the statement at the Imperial conference, however, Toyoda modified this passage to state that close to half of the enemy invasion force could be destroyed before landing. (1) Summary of statement by the Chief of Navy General Staff, Imperial conference, 8 Jun 45, with pencilled corrections made by Toyoda. Proceedings of the Supreme War Direction Council, op. cit. Part II. (2) Statement by Admiral Toyoda, previously cited.
86 Baron Hiranuma had not participated in the 6 June Council meeting but was invited to attend the 8 June conference in accordance with the customary practice of including the President of the Privy Council in important Imperial conferences. In his statement at the meeting Hiranuma emphasized the importance of the nation's morale and concluded that every effort should be made to bring the war to a successful conclusion banning any idea of peace. The Agriculture and Commerce Minister also was specially included in the Imperial conference in order to make a statement concerning the food situation.
87 The account of the Imperial conference proceedings is based on an official summary, classified "National Top-Secret," which was drawn up for distribution to a highly restricted number of key officials. It includes the principal statements made at the conference but not those of the High Command. Proceedings of the Supreme War Direction Council, op. cit. Part I.
88 Kido Diary, op. cit. Entry for 8 Jun 45, appended pages entitled Jikyoku Shushu Taisaku Shian (Draft Plan of Countermeasures to Meet the Situation.)
89 Statement by Marquis Matsudaira, previously cited.
90 Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., IMTFE Record, pp. 31,151-2.
91 Kampo (Official Gazette) Special Issue, 9 Jun 45, containing Stenographic Record of Proceedings of the House of Representatives, 87th Diet. (2) Premier Suzuki insisted upon retaining this particular passage in his speech despite the fact that most members of the Cabinet strongly advised him to leave it out. According to State Minister Sakonji, Suzuki wished to hint that "an unreasonable war is not good" and ought to be terminated speedily through the efforts of both sides. (Statement by Vice Adm. Sakonji, previously cited.)
92 In view of widespread rumors that the Army was behind the anti-Government move in the Diet, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu, after the close of the session, sought and obtained assurances from Lt. Gen. Yoshizumi, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, that the Army intended to continue its support of the Cabinet. (Statement by Lt. Gen. Yoshizumi, previously cited.)
93 General Umezu acknowledged to the Emperor that the combined strength of the Japanese forces in Manchuria was barely adequate to meet an eventual attack on the Continent, and that ammunition reserves would be exhausted in one major action. This revelation, though applicable to the situation on the Continent, had a marked influence on the Emperor's estimate of the prospects for the homeland battle since he was convinced that the troops in Japan Proper were far inferior in training and equipment to those on the Continent. (1) Memorandum notes of Rear Adm. Takagi, op. cit., (Conversation with Marquis Matsudaira, Chief Secretary to the Lord Privy Seal, in which Matsudaira disclosed the nature of Umezu's report to the Emperor and His Majesty's reaction, 14 Jun 45.) (2) Matsudaira learned the details of Umezu's report from Marquis Kido shortly after the Emperor's audience with Umezu on 9 June and later obtained the same information directly from the Emperor. (Statement by Marquis Matsudaira, previously cited.)
94 Statement by Admiral Kiyoshi Hasegawa, Special Naval Inspector, Feb-Aug 45.
95 (1) Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., IMTFE Record, pp. 31,153-5. (2) Statement by Marquis Kido, previously cited. (3) Memorandum notes of Rear Adm. Takagi, op. cit., (Conversation with Admiral Yonai regarding consultation with Kido, dated 14 Jun 45. )
96 It had been agreed at the time of the mid-May conferences that Premier Suzuki would report to the Throne on the decisions taken. Asked by Togo following his conversation with Kido on 15 June whether he had made such a report, the Premier admitted that he had neglected to do so. (Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited.)
97 (1) Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., IMTFE Record, pp. 31,155-6. (2) Statement by Marquis Kido, previously cited. (3) Togo Memoirs, op. cit., p. 9.
98 Togo Memoirs, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
99 In the course of this conversation, Anami significantly cautioned Kido that certain Army elements were suspicious that Kido was working for peace and were talking of his removal. (1) Affidavit of Kido, op. cit. IMTFE Record, pp. 31,156-8. (2) Statement by Marquis Kido, previously cited.
100 (1) Togo Memoirs, op. cit., p. 10. (2) Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., IMTFE Record, pp. 31,159-60.
101 Togo Memoirs, op. cit., p. 10.
102 (1) Ibid. (2) Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited. (3) Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., IMTFE Record, pp. 31,159-60.
103 (1) Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., IMTFE Record, pp. 31,160-62. (2) Statement by Marquis Kido, previously cited.
104 The proceedings of the Imperial conference of 22 June are summarized on the basis of the following sources (1) Kido Diary, op. cit. (Appended pages dated 22 Jun 45, recording the Emperor's account of the Imperial conference as orally given to Kido immediately following the conference.) (2) Memorandum notes by Rear Adm. Takagi, op. cit. (Conversation with Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, 23 Jun 45, in which Yonai gave an account of the Imperial conference proceedings.) (3) Togo Memoirs, op. cit., pp. 10-1. (4) Statements by Foreign Minister Togo and Admiral Toyoda, both previously cited.
105 Premier Suzuki told Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu following the 22 June Imperial conference that he now felt confident that he could terminate the war. "Today," he said to Sakomizu, "the Emperor said what everyone has wanted to say, but yet did not dare to say." Article entitled Kofukuji no Shinso (Truth of the Surrender Period) by Hisatsune Sakomizu. Asahi Newspaper, Tokyo, 13 Jan 46.
106 Hirota took advantage of Malik's reference to the return of peace between Russia and Germany to state that he hoped Japan might follow the Soviet example and restore peace at an early date. Malik replied that, since the Soviet Union was not a belligerent in the Far East, it had nothing to do with the question of peace there. Foreign Office Radios, op. cit., No. 843, Foreign Minister to Japanese Ambassador at Moscow, 28 Jun 45.
107 The statement said that Japan was prepared, under the proposed pact, to neutralize Manchuria upon conclusion of the East Asia war, and to relinquish fishing rights in Siberian waters in exchange for Soviet oil. It further stated that Japan would discuss any other terms or conditions which the Soviet Government desired. Ibid., No. 853, 30 Jun 45.
108 (1) Togo Memoirs, op. cit., p. 12, (2) Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited.
109 Foreign Office Radios, op. cit., No. 852, 30 Jun 45.
110 Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., IMTFE Record, pp. P,164-5.
111 Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited.
112 Togo Memoirs, op. cit., p. 13.
113 Foreign Office Radios, op. cit., No. 1330 and No. 1331, Japanese Ambassador at Moscow to Foreign Minister, 5 and 6 Jul 45.
114 Ibid., No. 875 and No. 884, Foreign Minister to Japanese Ambassador at Moscow, 5 and 9 Jul 45.
115 Ibid., No. 1364 and 1319, Japanese Ambassador at Moscow to Foreign Minister, 11 Jul 45.
116 Ibid., No. 890 and No. 891, Foreign Minister to Japanese Ambassador at Moscow, 11 Jul 45.
117 Kido Diary, op. cit., IMTFE Record, pp. 31,166-69.
118 Ibid., (Entry for 12 Jul 45, appended pages covering Emperor's audience with Prince Konoye.) IMTFE Record, pp. 31,170-71.
119 Foreign Office Radios, op. cit., No. 893, Foreign Minister to Japanese Ambassador at Moscow, 12 Jul 45.
120 Ibid., No. 1385, Japanese Ambassador at Moscow to Foreign Minister, 13 Jul 45.
121 Foreign Minister Togo reported to the Emperor on 18 July that he was confident that His Majesty's peace intentions had been transmitted to Stalin and Molotov before their departure from Moscow. The Emperor expressed satisfaction. Togo Memoirs, op. cit., p. 16.
122 (1) Ibid., p. 15. (2) Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited.
123 Foreign Office Radios, op. cit., No. 1417, Japanese Ambassador at Moscow to Foreign Minister, 19 Jul 45.
124 Ibid., No. 931 and No. 932, Foreign Minister to Japanese Ambassador at Moscow, 21 Jul 45.
125 Ibid., No. 1449 and No. 1450, Japanese Ambassador at Moscow to Foreign Minister, 25 Jul 45.
126 U. S. Department of State Publication No. 2423, The Axis in Defeat, pp. 27-9.
127 Foreign Office Radios, op. cit., Bei-ei-shi Potsudamu Sengen no Kento Study of the Anglo-American-Chinese Declaration at Potsdam) Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry, 9 Aug 45. (Though dated 9 August, this study was begun immediately after receipt of the declaration on 27 July.)
128 Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited.
129 Interrogation of Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu, previously cited. USSBS Interrogation No. 609, p. 5.
130 (1) Togo Memoirs, op. cit., p. 17. (2) Kido Diary, op. cit., Entry for 27 Jul 45.
131 (1) Togo Memoirs, op. cit., p. 17. (2) Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited.
132 (1) Shusenki (Record of the Termination of the War) by Hiroshi (Kainan) Shimomura, Oct 48, pp. 87-8. (2) Togo Memoirs, op. cit., pp. 17-8.
133 (1) Asahi and Mainichi Newspapers, Tokyo, 28 Jul 45. (2) Record of the Termination of the War, op. cit., pp. 87-9.
134 Asahi and Mainichi Newspapers, Tokyo, op. Cit., 28 Jul 45.
135 (1) Record of the Termination of the War, op. cit., p. 90. (2) Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited.
136 Record of the Termination of the War, op. cit., p. 90
137 Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu, previously cited.
138 Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited.
139 Foreign Office Radios, op. cit., No. 1484, Japanese Ambassador at Moscow to Foreign Minister, 30 Jul 45.
140 (1) Kido Diary, op. cit., (Entries dated 28 Jul to 3 Aug 45.) (2) Togo Memoirs, op. cit., p. 18.
141 Taiheiyo Senso ni yoru Waga Kuni no Higai Sogo Hokokusho (Consolidated Report of Losses and Damage Suffered in the Pacific War) Economic Stabilization Board, 1949, pp. 577-80.
142 Many Japanese authorities were aware that scientists abroad were engaged in atomic research for war purposes, but it was not believed that success would be achieved during the present war. Following successive reports from the scene of disaster, the authorities grew more convinced of the truth of the American broadcast, though there were some who at first were inclined to discredit the Truman announcement as propaganda intended to frighten the Japanese. (1) Record of the Termination of the War, op. cit., p. 98. (2) Atomic research had been conducted in great secrecy by both the Army and Navy for some time during the war, but experiments were dropped early in 1945 because of the prodigious expense and the small likelihood of achieving success in the immediate future. (Statement by Lt. Gen. Kawabe, previously cited.)
143 Included in the mission led by Lt. Gen. Seizo Arisue, were Dr. Yoshio Nishina, foremost atomic energy authority in Japan, the only civilian; and a number of experts from the Army Aeronautical Department and the Army Medical School. Delayed by an accident en route, Nishina's party did not reach Hiroshima until the afternoon of 8 August, but it quickly established the facts. (Statements by Dr. Yoshio Nishina and Lt. Gen. Seizo Arisue, Chief, Second Bureau (Intelligence), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.)
144 Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited.
145 Suspicious of Soviet intentions, Imperial General Headquarters had already ordered the Kwantung Army to prepare against Soviet aggression. Hard pressed on the Pacific front, almost all the efficient weapons, such as aircraft and antiaircraft guns, as well as the better-trained troops, were withdrawn to Japan for the anticipated homeland battle, leaving the once-mighty Kwantung Army with nothing but poorly equipped troops. Accordingly, Imperial General Headquarters stipulated in May 1945 that the main line of defense was to be limited to south Manchuria and north Korea.
146 (1) The Japanese Government was not officially informed of the Russian declaration of war until 1115 hours, 10 August, when the Soviet envoy Malik, called on Foreign Minister Togo to deliver his Government's note. (2) Soren Sansen ni tomonau Tsuzuri (File on Soviet Entry into War) Part I, 9-20 Aug 45.
147 "The Premier seemed quite unperturbed when told of the news of the Russian entry into the war and merely replied that the inevitable had finally occurred." The question to many in high Government quarters was not whether the Soviet Union would enter the war but when. Truth of the Surrender Period, Asahi Newspaper, Tokyo, 14 Jan 46.
148 Kido Diary, op. cit., IMTFE Record, p. 31,172.
149 Fearing that a complete agreement was impossible if the issue of continued war or surrender was left to the Big Six Council and the Cabinet, Suzuki, during his morning audience with the Emperor, asked him to express an Imperial opinion. The Emperor quickly agreed. (Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu, previously cited.)
150 Statement by Admiral Toyoda, previously cited.
151 A summary of what took place in this conference can be found in the following document: Memorandum Notes of Lt. Gen. Sumihisa Ikeda, Chief, Cabinet Coordination and Planning Bureau, 27 Jul-17 Aug 45.
152 The Cabinet had been ordered to assemble by noon by which time it appears Suzuki had hoped to secure the six leaders' approval of the Government's peace plan. The Cabinet did not meet until 1430 because of the cleavage in the Council and was closeted until 2230 in acrimonious debate. Record of the Termination of the War, op. cit., p. 116.
153 While the Nagasaki bombing does not appear to have had much influence on the peace discussions in the Cabinet, the fact that a second atom bomb had been dropped even before the Japanese had begun to recover from the horrible experiences at Hiroshima aroused widespread fear among the people that other cities might soon be deluged by this extremely destructive enemy weapon. A rumor was then circulating that what was left of Tokyo would be destroyed before 15 August. Nagasaki, like Hiroshima, had until 9 August escaped the general air raids experienced by other major cities. In proportion to the area hit, Nagasaki suffered much more heavily in dead and injured than Hiroshima. Out of a total population of 270,000, there were 23,753 killed and 43,020 injured. (1) Consolidated Report of Losses and Damage Suffered in the Pacific War, op. cit., pp. 179-180. (2) Tokyo Sous Les Bombes, an article by Father Joseph Flaujac, appearing in the Bethany Institute Bulletin No. 5, 1940-47, p. 31.
154 Munitions Minister Teijiro Toyoda revealed that munitions production had fallen sharply since late spring; that the slump was due to transportation difficulties and failing morale of the workers who, he admitted, had lost "all sense of security and confidence in the Government and the armed forces." Agriculture and Commerce Minister Ishiguro reported that the crop year was the worst since 1931 and that in various areas famine conditions by winter were inevitable. Especially deplorable, he added, was the fact that soldiers were entering homes and taking whatever they needed to appease their hunger. Home Minister Abe stated bluntly that the people had lost confidence in winning the war; that the atomic bomb and the Russian invasion had aggravated war weariness, but said some elements of the people were determined to fight on. An equally grim outlook on transportation and communications prospects was given by Transportation Minister Kohiyama. Record of Termination of the War, op. cit., pp. 116-125.
155 Suzuki, never permitted either the Big Six Council or the Cabinet to break up their discussions. Whenever he found it impossible to secure the necessary unanimity, he called a recess. This policy proved successful because it enabled him to resume the meetings on a moment's notice, when time was so precious. (Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu, previously cited.)
156 Hiranuma attended the conference at the invitation of the Emperor. It was believed that the attendance of Hiranuma was necessary to help reach a final decision on the formal diplomatic note to be made to the Allies. (Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu, previously cited.)
157 Two of them, Lt. Gen. Yoshizumi and Vice Adm. Hoshina, the Chiefs of the Military and Naval Affairs Bureaus of the War and Navy Ministries respectively, were ex-officio secretaries of the Supreme War Direction Council. The other was Lt. Gen. Sumihisa Ikeda, Chief of the Cabinet Coordination and Planning Bureau, which was also an ex-officio secretary of the Council since April 1 945.
158 From a manuscript written by Vice Adm. Hoshina, who sat in discussions as ex-officio secretary.
159 War Minister Anami on 13 August intimated to his subordinates in the War Ministry that he had scented intrigue by the opposing faction when he found only the Foreign Minister's plan on the agenda. Anami instantly whispered to Umezu, Chief of the Army General Staff, who was seated next to him, that they should insist on continuation of the war instead of standing on their previous arguments for the four conditions. (Statement by Lt. Col. Inaba, previously cited.)
160 The Chief of the Army General Staff argued that the situation was not so bad that there was no other choice but surrender and that to lay down arms "we will do a great wrong to our war dead." The Chief of the Navy General Staff doubted that the Japanese people would agree to capitulate without trouble resulting. "The Japanese sense of honor is too great to endure the sight of their land being occupied or their arms being taken away," he declared. Unpublished Record of Japanese Navy General Staff, p. 3.
161 Suzuki's decision to request Imperial intercession to solve an emergency issue was an extraordinary one in Japanese constitutional usage. In all previous conferences in the Emperor's presence, the agenda had been well prepared in advance and unanimously agreed upon among the authorities concerned. Suzuki's determination to pull Japan out of the war is perhaps best illustrated in his post-surrender reflections in Features of the Termination of the War, in which he defends his position in refusing to resign during the crucial period when his Cabinet was split on the surrender issue. Of significance are the following passages which read in substance: "In accordance with the established interpretation, the Emperor was exempt from political responsibilities, and his sanction was nothing but a legal formality. Even in national emergencies the Government decided policy. But it has been my long cherished idea that the Government ought to seek the Emperor's opinion in case they cannot reach an agreement among themselves on a national question of paramount importance."Features of the Termination of the War, op. cit., pp. 46-47.
162 The Emperor's statement is based on the unpublished manuscript of Vice Adm. Hoshina.
163 The entire Cabinet signed the ratification papers. (Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu, previously cited.)
164 The Japanese Government's message to the four Allied Powers is contained in the Swiss Charge d'affaires note to the U.S. Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, dated 10 August. The Axis in Defeat, op. Cit., p. 29.
165 At 0900, Anami called together the officers of lieutenant colonel's rank and above to explain the decision taken at the Imperial conference of 9-10 August, declaring : " ...though I am sorry for you, it can't be helped, because this is the Emperor's opinion. The important thing for us to do is to maintain order in the Army. No individual should resort to undisciplined action. Anyway, this decision is made on the condition that the national polity will be preserved. Consequently, the war has not ended with this decision. The Army must be prepared for both peace and war." (Statement by Lt. Col, Masahiko Takeshita, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry. Takeshita is the brother-in-law of General Anami.)
166 Statement by Adm. Toyoda, previously cited.
167 Yomiuri-Hochi and Asahi Newspapers, op. cit., Tokyo, 11 Aug 45.
168 (1) On the morning of 10 August, on the recommendation of one of his subordinates, Anami approved a plan to issue instructions to the officers and men on the fields as necessary to maintain the Army's morale in the face of the Soviet entry into the war. Before the draft was formally approved, officers in charge of Army press releases prepared duplicates and handed them to newspapermen. The newspapers received the purportedly official Army release shortly before 1600, less than three hours before the printing deadline. Radio Tokyo broadcast the War Minister's in structions just preceding the Cabinet's announcement. (Statements by Lt. Col. Takeshita and Lt. Col. Inaba, previously cited.)
(2) Although the editorial staff of the Asahi Newspaper, which prominently carried both announcements, did not doubt the authenticity of the Army's request, it distinctly felt the sharp differences in the spirit of the Cabinet and War Ministry announcements. After a hot debate among the editors, it was decided to give the Army announcement as much prominence as the Cabinet statement. This action reflected the strong influence which the Army maintained over the press and propaganda organs. (Statement by Taihei Oshima, member of editorial staff of the Asahi Newspaper.)
169 Yomiuri-Hochi and Asahi Newspapers, op. cit., Tokyo, 11 Aug 45.
170 The Axis in Defeat, op. cit., pp. 30-1.
171 Joint plea to the Emperor by Gen. Umezu and Adm. Toyoda, Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs, respectively. The Unpublished Record of the Japanese Navy General Staff, p. 3.
172 (1) Anami was approached by a group of young officers as he was leaving his office for the outside. After listening to the pleas of his subordinates, he hurriedly left the room without committing himself. (Statement by Lt. Col. Takeshita, previously cited. (2) Anami visited Suzuki's official residence at 1130, 12 August. Dosei-Tsuzuri (Record of the Movements of Cabinet Ministers.) This record was kept by the Political Affairs Section of the Tokyo Kempeitai Headquarters. (3) Foreign Minister Togo told Matsumoto late in the afternoon of 12 August that he feared Suzuki had been influenced by Anami and Hiranuma not to accept the broadcast Allied reply. (Statement by Shunichi Matsumoto, Foreign Vice-Minister, May-Aug 45.)
173 Paragraph Four: "The ultimate form of Government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." The military feared that this clause implied an ultimate change in the statutory position of the Emperor. Togo and his supporters argued that this paragraph should be interpreted to mean that the Japanese themselves would be permitted to decide what form of government they wanted and that such being the case it was inconceivable that the Japanese would desire any fundamental change in the Emperor System. Togo Memoirs, op. Cit., pp. 23-4.
174 Statements by Vice Adm. Hoshina and Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu, previously cited.
175 By this time the news of the secret peace negotiations were beginning to leak out to the public, and the Government was subject to both threats and encouragement. Handbills began appearing in the streets of Tokyo with the declaration: "Down with the Badoglio regime of Suzuki-Togo-Yonai."
176 The statement in the Allied answer, based on the Potsdam Declaration, which provided that the ultimate form of Government of Japan was to be determined by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people indicated that the Emperor system was not to be abolished, but rather, was clear to those who knew the Japanese people, that it was to be preserved. If the Emperor system were accepted, it naturally followed that the current position of the Emperor would likewise be accepted. (Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited.)
177 Statement by Foreign Minister Togo, previously cited.
178 Statement by Foreign Vice-Minister Matsumoto, previously cited.
179 (1) The Allied reply was received by the Foreign Office message center at 1840. It had been dispatched from Berne by the Japanese Minister in Switzerland at 2324, 11 August (0724, 12 August, Tokyo Time.) Foreign Office Radios, op. cit., Japanese Minister Kase's Radiogram Relaying Byrnes Reply, 12 Aug 45. (2) Upon specific instructions from the Foreign Vice-Minister, Akira Oe, Chief of Radio Section, stamped the time of official receipt of the message as 0740, 13 August. News of the receipt was withheld so that the peace faction in the Foreign Office could martial their forces for the impending showdown on the surrender issue. (Statement by Foreign Vice-Minister Matsumoto, previously cited.)
180 Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., IMTFE Record, pp. 31, 185-186.
181 Foreign Office Radios, op. cit., copy of telegram received by Foreign Office at 0210, 13 August, from Suemasa Okamoto, Japanese Minister to Sweden.
182 Record of the Termination of the War, op. cit., pp. 138144.
183 Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu, while successful in his maneuver of the 9th to obtain prior consent by Umezu and Toyoda to the convocation of an Imperial conference, was unable to do so on the 13th. On the morning of the 13th, officials of the War Ministry and the Army and Navy General Staffs agreed not to sanction an Imperial meeting until the Big Six Council had agreed unanimously on the surrender issue. The War Minister, who had steadfastly resisted the peace moves in the Council and Cabinet debates, insisted that the surrender issue should be resolved by the members of the Council and the Cabinet and that invocation of the Emperor's decision should be avoided as far as possible. (Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu, previously cited.)
184 A half-dozen officers holding key positions in the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, including Major Hatanaka (who later was to become one of the ringleaders in the Palace revolt), called on Anami at 2000 hours, 13 August, bearing plans for a large-scale coup d'etat. The plan roughly was as follows: (a) The aim to elicit from the Emperor sanction to continue negotiations until the desired peace conditions were met: (b) The forces to be used; the 1st Imperial Guards Division and the Twelfth Area Army: (c) Course of action; the bitter-end resistance faction, taking advantage of a provision in the Imperial Ordinance concerning martial law, which authorizes local garrison commanders to proclaim martial law provisionally without Imperial sanction in the case of emergency, was to place the whole Tokyo area under martial law. By so doing, the Emperor would be isolated from the peace group and would be requested to issue such order as the Army might desire. (d) Prerequisites ; the War Minister, the Chief of the Army General Staff, the Commander of the Eastern District Army, and the Commander of the 1st Imperial Guards Division should all agree to the plan. Anami, while appearing favorably disposed to the plan, begged for time to make a final decision and said, " I will give you a definite reply tomorrow morning after I have thought it over." (Statement by Lt. Col. Inaba, previously cited. Inaba was one of six members who discussed the coup d'etat plan.)
185 In accordance with custom, more rigidly observed in recent years, an Imperial conference was convoked upon the joint request of the Premier and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs and only after they had agreed upon the issues. This left the Emperor with virtually no necessity to express his own opinion. Under the circumstances, it was almost unthinkable that an Imperial conference would be convoked without the previous consent of the High Command.
186 The developments noted on this page are taken from material found in: (1) Affidavit of Kido, op. cit., pp. 31, 189-191. (2) Statement by Marquis Kido, previously cited.
187 Following the conference, the Emperor revealed to the War and Navy Ministers of his readiness to dispatch his aide-de-camps to Army and Navy headquarters to appeal to the armed forces. Navy Minister Yonai promptly declined the offer, saying he would do his utmost to secure the Navy's compliance with the Imperial wish for surrender. War Minister Anami followed suit. Notes on the Termination of the War, op. cit., p. 59.
188 (1) Ibid., pp. 58-9, (2) Truth of the Surrender Period, op. cit. Asahi Newspaper, Tokyo, 19 Jan 46.
189 As the Army's top agent in the Cabinet, Anami was fully cognizant of both the direction being taken by the Government and the widespread desire within the Army for the continuation of the war. At the same time, while vigorously championing the cause of bitter-end resistance in the conference discussions, he did not disclose the Cabinet's peace intentions to the Army staff until 10 August, but took full responsibility for his own actions. Anami could have at any time wrecked the Cabinet by resigning or effecting a coup d'etat, and thus forced a fight to the finish, but he was reluctant to oppose what were the explicit wishes of the Emperor. (1) Statements by Marquis Kido, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu, Foreign Minister Togo and Lt. Col. Takeshita, all previously cited. (2) Record on the Termina tion of the War, op. cit., pp. 173-4. (3) Fall of the Japanese Army, op. cit., p. 511. (4) "Mitsumasa Youai and Korechika Auami," by Seizo Sakouji, Maru magazine, Sep 49.
190 Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu, previously cited.
191 The Axis in Defeat, op. cit., pp. 31-2.
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